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THE CASE AGAINST FIFRA PREEMPTION
THE PAST AND PRESENT STATE OF THE FIFRA PREEMPTION
CONTROVERSY
The History, Regulatory Structure, and Preemptin Language of
FIFRA
The History of Pesticide Regulatin
Congress' first attempt to regulate the pesticide industry was
the Insecticide Act of 1910,' which was primarily designed to
protect consumers from acts of fraud relating to the commercial
sale of imsbranded or adulterated chemical products.8 Congress
repealed the Act in 1947 and replaced it with a broader regula-
tory measure designed to ensure the "safe use and labeling of
pesticides [in order] to protect those who came in immediate
contact with them."9 Congress crafted the 1947 version of
FIFRA to respond to regulatory demands brought on by a rapid-
ly expanding pesticide industry'" The measure was designed to
provide for some level of umformity in definitions, encourage
cooperation between state and federal regulators, and create a
centralized registration and licensing .authority under the Secre-
tary of Agriculture."
The focus of pesticide regulation continued to shift with in-
creased public concern. 2 Accordingly, the 1964 amendments to
FIFRA broadened the regulatory scheme to address the effects of
pesticides on wildlife and the environment." Given this new
focus, upon its creation in 1970, the Environmental Protection
7. Insecticide Act of 1910, ch. 185, 36 Stat. 331 (1910), repealed by Federal In-
secticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, ch. 125, § 16, 61 Stat. 163, 172 (1947), 7
U.S.C. § 136-136y (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see DerGazanan v. Dow Chem. Co., 836
F Supp. 1429, 1431 (W.D. Ark. 1993); Boeh, supra note 5, at 753.
8. See S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 3999; Smith & Coonrod, supra note 5, at 490.
9. Smith & Coonrod, supra note 5, at 490.
10. Id.
11. Id., see.also H.R. REP. No. 313, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
12. Smith & Coonrod, supra note 5, at 490.
13. Id.
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Agency (EPA) assumed responsibility for pesticide regulation. 4
Nonetheless, FIFRA remained "primarily a licensing and label-
ing statute"5 until 197216 when a "wholesale redrafting"17 of
the statute "transformed FIFRA from a labeling law into a com-
prehensive regulatory statute."
18
Overvew of FIFRA's Regulatory Structure
In its present form, FIFRA grants the EPA extensive regulato-
ry authority over virtually every aspect of the pesticide manufac-
turing process. Manufacturers are required to register their
production facilities with the EPA and to maintain books and
records of their manufacturing processes for government inspec-
tion. 9 In addition, to receive government registration for a par-
ticular compound, manufacturers must submit the chemical
product to the EPA, complete with a proposed label and direc-
tions for use.2" Furthermore, the Adinimstrator has the power
to withhold a chemical product's registration until the manufac-
turer provides additional information, such as chemical composi-
tion, physical and chemical characteristics, and chemical metab-
olism.2' Registration approval is granted only if the chemical
product's composition and labeling comply with EPA regula-
tions,22 and the Adminimstrator deems that the product will
serve its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects
on public health or the environment."
FIFRA also delegates to the EPA considerable enforcement
14. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 (Environmental Protection Agency), § 8, 84
Stat. 2086, 2088 (1970); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F Supp. 1128, 1134
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); Smith & Coonrod, supra note 5, at 491.
15. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1984).
16. 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (amending Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947)).
17. Smith & Coonrod, supra note 5, at 491.
18. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991.
19. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136e-136g (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
20. Id. § 136a; see also 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (1993) (outlining the labeling require-
ments for pesticides).
21. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2); Ausness, supra note 5, at 213 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§
158.150, 158.202 (1992)).
22. See 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (1993).
23. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(5), 136(d)(1)(C).
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authority 4 Failure to comply with the standards enunciated by
the Administrator can result in significant sanctions. In case of
a violation, the EPA may prohibit the sale or use of the product,
remove or seize it, enforce civil penalties of up to five thousand
dollars, or impose crimnal liability of up to twenty-five thou-
sand dollars and/or up to one year of incarceration."
State involvement in the regulation of chemical products is a
crucial aspect of the FIFRA regulatory scheme. Section 136t(b)
requires the EPA Administrator to cooperate with other federal
agencies as well as appropriate agencies of any state or political
subdivisions thereof.26 Moreover, section 136w-1 grants to the
states primary enforcement responsibility for pesticide use viola-
tions pursuant to FIFRA.2'
The Language of the FIFRA Preemption Provzsions
Section 136v lies at the core of the FIFRA preemption contro-
versy The Supreme Court specifically addressed the preemp-
tive effect of section 136v(a) in Wisconsin 'Public Intervenor v.
Mortzer,29 concluding that the legislative history surrounding
FIFRA clearly demonstrates "an unwillingness by Congress to
grant political subdivisions regulatory authority, [but] does
not demonstrate an intent to prevent the States from delegating
such authority to its subdivisions, and still less does it show a
24. Id. §§ 136j-1361.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 136t(b).
27. Id. § 136w-1.
28. Section 136v states:
Authority of States
(a) In general
A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered
pesticide or device m the State, but only if and to the extent the regula-
tion does not permit any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter.
(b) Uniformity
Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements
for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required
under this subchapter.
Id. § 136v. Significantly, Congress added the sub-headings to § 136v(a) and (b) to
the language of the FIFRA preemption provisions via a 1978 amendment. Smith &
Coonrod, supra note 5, at 491.
29. 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
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desire to prohibit local regulation altogether.""0 Thus, section
136v(a) has been called a state power "savings clause" that re-
serves to the states broad powers within the FIFRA regulatory
scheme.3'
Wisconsin Public Intervenor settled the issue of FIFRA pre-
emption under the state "savings clause."32 However, the Su-
preme Court has not yet directly addressed the preemptive effect
of FIFRA section 136v(b). As the interpretation of that provision
has obvious implications for the viability of state common law
tort claims, the preemptive scope of FIFRA section 136v(b) has
been a topic of controversy in the legal community 33
Traditional Preemptin Analysis
The preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, which declares that the laws of the United
States shall be the supreme law of the land.' Traditionally,
preemption has been found in one of three ways: (1) express
preemption (by the actual language of the federal statute or leg-
islative history of the statute),5 (2) implied preemption by fed-
eral occupation of a regulatory field, 6 or (3) implied preemption
because of an actual conflict between federal and state law "
The Court has recognized sub-categories to each of these three
30. Id. at 609.
31. Id. at 609-10.
32. See id. at 606-16.
33. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 46-92 and
184-243 and accompanying text.
34. In full, the Supremacy Clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
35. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
525 (1977)).
36. Id. at 203-04 (citing Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153 (1982)).
37. Id. at 204.
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main categories of preemption. For instance, express preemption
may occur either when a federal statute specifically excludes
state regulation" or when an admimstrative body promulgates
preemptive regulations within the scope of its delegated authori-
ty " Similarly, implied preemption by federal occupation of a
regulatory field may occur where a dominant federal interest is
at stake or where federal regulation of a particular area is so
pervasive as to leave no room for supplemental or parallel state
regulation." Finally, implied preemption, because of an actual
conflict between federal and state law, may occur where (1)
compliance with both federal and state law is impossible,4' (2)
compliance with state law would frustrate the objectives of the
federal regulatory scheme, 2 or (3) state law impairs a federal-
ly-created right."
Significantly, the Court's preemption jurisprudence recognizes
the importance of state sovereignty, a principle upon which our
federal system of government was constructed: "[C]onsideration
of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not
to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that [is] the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress."'4 Thus, the Court has es-
tablished a clear presumption against preemption of the general
police power historically reserved for the states.45
38. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 234-36 (1947).
39. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 158-59.
40. Schnedewmd v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1988) (citing Rice,
331 U.S. at 230); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-48
(1959).
41. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 137 (1913).
42. Miclugan Canners & Freezers Ass'n. v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaunng Bd.,
467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
43. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 659 (1950).
44. Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992) (quoting Rice,
331 U.S. at 230).
45. Id. at 2618; Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITu-
TIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 479 & n.7 (2d ed. 1988).
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The Circuit Split Regarding FIFRA Preemption Prior to
Cipollone
Courts Finding No Preemption Prior to Cipollone
One of the first federal appellate cases to address whether
FIFRA section 136v(b) preempted state common law claims
based on inadequate labelling was Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical
Co.4" In Ferebee, the estate of a deceased agricultural worker
filed suit against Chevron, a manufacturer of the chemical
paraquat, alleging that the decedent contracted pulmonary fibro-
sis from long-term skin exposure to diluted paraquat 7 The
plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer failed to adequately
label the substance to warn of such a risk." Chevron argued
that the plaintiffs state law failure-to-warn claim was preempt-
ed by section 136v(b) of FIFRA, because FIFRA required Chev-
ron to obtain EPA approval of its paraquat label. 9 The court
rejected Chevron's argument and held that FIFRA did not pre-
empt the state common law failure-to-warn action. 0
The D C. Circuit Court engaged in both an express and an
implied preemption analysis in Ferebee.1 Initially, the court
recognized the established presumption against federal preemp-
tion of state police powers. 2 In light of this presumption, the
court failed to find an explicit preemption of state common law
actions because section 136v(b) does not specifically prohibit the
imposition of common law liability Rather, the court interpreted
the language of the statute to "merely [preclude] states from
directly ordering changes in the EPA-approved labels.""3 In oth-
er words, the court drew a distinction between the imposition of
46. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dented, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
47. Id. at 1531.
48. Id. at 1531-32.
49. Id. at 1539.
50. Id. at 1543.
51. Id. at 1542-43.
52. '[It is necessary to bear in mind the circumspect view courts must take
of a claim that Congress has pre-empted states from exercising their traditional
police powers on behalf of their citizens." Id. at 1542.
53. Id.
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common law liability and positive enactments of state rule-mak-
ing bodies, finding that the former, unlike the latter, was not a
"requirement for labeling or packaging" so as to qualify for
FIFRA preemption under section 136v(b) of that Act:
Maryland can be conceived of as having decided that, if it
must abide by EPA's determination that a label is adequate,
Maryland will nonetheless require manufacturers to bear the
risk of any injuries that could have been prevented had
Maryland been allowed to require a more detailed label or
had Chevron persuaded EPA that a more comprehensive
label was needed. The verdict itself does not command Chev-
ron to alter its label-the verdict merely tells Chevron that, if
it chooses to continue selling paraquat in Maryland, it may
have to compensate for some of the resulting injuries. That
may m some sense impose a burden on the sale of paraquat
m Maryland, but it is not equivalent to a direct regulatory
command that Chevron change its label.54
Having established that no express preemption existed, the
court in Ferebee then considered the possibility of implied pre-
emption. Because the court classified the provision of tort reme-
dies for personal injuries as one of those powers traditionally
exercised by the states on behalf of their citizens,55 it did not
find a dominant federal interest in pesticide regulation. "6 More-
over, the court concluded that the clear authority given the
states in the "savings clause" of FIFRA section 136v(a) precluded
the possibility of pervasive federal occupation of the field of pes-
ticide regulation. " Similarly, the court was unable to find an
actual conflict between FIFRA section 136v(b) and state common
law damage claims.58 Specifically, the court found that Chevron
could comply with both federal and state laws in either of two
ways: (1) by continuing to use the EPA-approved label and sim-
ply absorbing the costs of successful tort claims, or (2) by peti-
54. Id. at 1541.
55. Id. at 1542 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 144 (1963)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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tioning the EPA to make the label more comprehensive." Fur-
thermore, state common law claims were not seen as an obstacle
to the federal regulatory objective because "federal legislation
has traditionally occupied a limited role as a floor of safe con-
duct [not as] a ceiling on the ability of states to protect their
citizens.""0 Indeed, rather than an obstacle in the federal regu-
latory scheme, the court viewed state common law actions as a
measure that would further "legitimate regulatory aims" by
exposing new dangers associated with pesticides and giving
manufacturers an incentive to petition for adequate labeling
standards."'
The "choice of reaction" 2 theory put forth in Ferebee was
adopted by the majority of courts that addressed the issue of
preemption under section 136v(b) prior to Cipollone.3
Courts Finding Preemptin Pror to Cipollone
In Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,' a federal district court
in the Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion from
Ferebee. In that case, Fitzgerald, a greenskeeper who developed
mercury poisoning after exposure to Mallinckrodt's fungicide,
sued for negligent labeling and failure to warn." Mallinckrodt
moved for summary judgment because the state common law
claim was preempted by FIFRA section 136v(b), and the district
court granted the motion.6
In Fitzgerald, the district court, like the circuit court in
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1543.
61. Id. at 1541.
62. Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F Supp. 404, 407 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (quot-
ing Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 1987)).
63. See, e.g., Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F Laucks and Co., 775 F Supp.
1339 (D. Mont. 1991), affd, 993 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1993); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter,
834 S.W.2d 136 (Ark. 1992); see also Thornton v. Fondgren Green Apartments, 788
F Supp. 928 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F Supp. 1500 (W.D.
Mo. 1991); Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F Supp. 1345 (S.D. Ind.
1990); Stewart v. Ortho Consumer Prods., No. 87-4252, 1990 WL 36129 (E.D. La.
Mar. 26, 1990); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Rob-
erts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F Supp. 195 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
64. 681 F Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Ferebee," engaged in both an express and an implied preemp-
tion analysis." However, it is reasonable to conclude from the
Fitzgerald opimon that the court found the language of section
136v(b) so clear that it would not have undergone any implied
preemption analysis at all without the D.C. Circuit's opimon in
Ferebee:
While typically divining whether Congress intended to pre-
empt state law is a difficult, haphazard process, in the in-
stant statute, Congress has expressly stated its intent to
preempt any state labeling or packaging requirements dif-
ferent from or additional to those mandated by FIFRA.
Although the language of the statute appears to clearly indi-
cate Congressional intent to preempt state labeling regula-
tions, one court has found to the contrary 69
In finding that state common law claims for failure to ade-
quately warn were also impliedly preempted by section 136v(b)
of FIFRA because they present an actual conflict between state
and federal law, the district court in Fitzgerald relied heavily on
the First Circuit's opinion in Palmer v. Lzgget Group, Inc., ° a
preemption case arising under the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act of 1965."' Adopting language from Palmer,
the court in Fitzgerald characterized the "choice of reaction"
theory relied upon in Ferebee as "akin to the free choice of com-
ing up for air after being underwater.""2 In so holding, the
court refused to recogmze the distinction between positive enact-
ments by state rule-malkng bodies and state common law ac-
tions, a distinction central to the D.C. Circuit's disposition of
Ferebee."3 In other words, the court in Fitzgerald held that im-
posing state common law liability was sufficiently regulatory so
as to qualify as a "requiremento for labeling or packaging in
67. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
68. Fitzgerald, 681 F Supp. at 406-08.
69. Id. at 406.
70. 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1970).
72. Fitzgerald, 681 F Supp. at 407 (quoting Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627).
73. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
1995] 793
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:783
addition to or different from" that required by FIFRA.74
The court in Fitzgerald refused to "effectively authorize the
state to do through the back door exactly what it cannot through
the front"75 in order to avoid "abrogat[ing] Congress' intent to
provide uniform regulations governing the labeling of
pesticides"" and "arrogat[ing] to a single jury the regulatory
power explicitly denied to all fifty states' legislative bodies."77
At least two federal circuit courts that addressed the issue
prior to Cipollone agreed with the holding in Fitzgerald." In
one of those decisions, Papas v. Upjohn Co. (Papas I),79 a hu-
mane society worker brought a common law claim for inade-
quate labeling against the manufacturers of flea and tick powder
that he applied to ammals in the course of his job."0
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals undertook both an
express and an implied preemption analysis in Papas L"8 In its
express preemption analysis, the court looked to the actual lan-
guage of section 136v(b) as well as the legislative history of the
statute.8 2 Ultimately, however, the court in Papas I skirted the
74. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b).
75. Fitzgerald, 681 F Supp. at 407.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Palmer v. Ligget Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 628 (ist Cir. 1987)).
78. See, e.g., Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc.,
959 F.2d 158 (ioth Cir.) (Arkansas-Platte I), vacated sub. nom., Arkansas-Platte &
Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992) (Arkansas-Platte II), on
remand, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th- Cir.) (Arkansas-Platte III), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60
(1993) (Arkansas-Platte IV); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991)
(Papas I), vacated sub. nom., Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992) (Papas
II), on remand, 985 F.2d 516 (lth Cir.) (Papas III), cert. denied, sub. nom., 114 S.
Ct. 300 (1993) (Papas IV).
79. Papas, 926 F.2d at 1019.
80. Id. at 1020.
81. Id. at 1021-26.
82. The court noted:
The statute's language, by itself, is a powerful limit on state power over
labeling. A report accompanying the bill, as originally reported out of the
House Committee, also indicated the limits on state power due to the
division of authority between the federal and state governments: 'In di-
viding the responsibility between the States and the Federal Government
for the management of an effective pesticide program, the Committee had
adopted language which is intended to completely preempt State authori-
ty in regard to labeling and packaging.' H.R. Rep. 92-511, 92d Cong. 1st
Sess. 16 (1971). [Similarly,] subsection (b) preempted 'any State
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express preemption question, noting: "Given FIFRA's words and
its legislative history, FIFRA may expressly preempt state com-
mon law But, mindful that 'Congress has long demonstrat-
ed an aptitude for expressly barring common law actions when it
so desires,' we admit to a little uncertainty and pass over the
question of express preemption."'
The court began its implied preemption analysis by citing
precedent finding that common law liability is tantamount to
state regulation: "The principle of implied preemption 'applies
whether the federal law is embodied in a statute or regulation,
and whether the state law is rooted in a statute, regulation, or
common law rule."'' Given this starting point, it is not surpris-
ing that the court in Papas I rejected the Ferebee "choice of reac-
tion" rationale and adopted the Fitzgerald implied preemption
holding.
The court's opinion in Papas I identified three independent
reasons for the finding that state common law actions for inade-
quate labeling are impliedly preempted by FIFRA section
136v(b).5 First, like the district court in Fitzgerald,"8 the cir-
cuit court in Papas I found that the imposition of civil liability
would result in a direct conflict with federal law to the extent
that a state jury could declare an EPA-approved label inade-
quate, thereby frustrating Congressional intent to charge the
EPA Administrator with oversight of pesticide labeling regula-
tion." Similarly, allowing state common law actions would
"stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full objectives of Congress"8 to the extent that individual
state jury findings would encourage manufacturers to utilize dif-
labeling or packaging requirements differing from such requirements
under the Act.' S.Rep. 92-838, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News at 4021.
Id. at 1023.
83. Id. at 1023-24 (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 1022 (quoting Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 826 (11th
Cir. 1989)).
85. Id. at 1024-26.
86. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
87. Papas, 926 F.2d at 1025.
88. Id. (quoting Loisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986)
(citation omitted)).
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ferent labels in different states, thereby precluding the realiza-
tion of the Congressional goal of uniformity in pesticide label-
ing. 9 Finally, the circuit court found implied preemption be-
cause the regulations adopted pursuant to FIFRA "occup[y] the
entire field of labeling regulation, leaving no room for the states
to supplement federal law, even by means of state common law
tort actions."9"
The key holding of Fitzgerald and Papas I-the finding of
FIFRA preemption of state common law claims based on failure
adequately to warn9--was adopted in some form by a minority
of courts which addressed the issue of preemption under FIFRA
section 136v(b) prior to Cipollone.9"
The Cipollone Decision
Facts and Procedural Posture
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., Cipollone, the son of a
woman who died of lung cancer in 1984 after smoking for forty-
two years, maintained a cause of action on behalf of her estate
against Liggett, the manufacturer of her brand of cigarettes.94
Cipollone's suit alleged design defect, failure to warn, express
warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to de-
fraud. 5 As one of its defenses, Liggett claimed that the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 196596 (the 1965 Act)
and its successor, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
89. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 156).
90. Id.
91. Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F Supp. 404, 407-08 (E.D. Mich. 1987);
Papas, 926 F.2d at 1026.
92. See, e.g., Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc.,
959 F.2d 158 (ioth Cir.) (Arkansas-Platte I), vacated sub. nom., Arkansas-Platte &
Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992) (Arkansas-Platte II);
Young v. American Cyanamid Co., 786 F Supp. 781 (E.D. Ark. 1991); Hurt v. Dow
Chem. Co., 759 F Supp. 556 (E.D. Mo. 1990); Herr v. Carolina Log Bldgs., Inc., 771
F Supp. 958 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F Supp. 799 (M.D.
Fla. 1989); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F Supp. 1283 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
93. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
94. Id. at 2614.
95. Id.
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1339 (1965).
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1969" (the 1969 Act) preempted state common law claims
based on the conduct of the defendant after 1965." After the
district court granted a motion by Cipollone to strike the pre-
emption defense entirely, 9 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held on an interlocutory appeal that the federal legislation,
while not expressly preempting the state common law claims,
impliedly preempted those claims that "challenge[d] either the
adequacy of the warning on cigarette packages or the propriety
of a party's actions with respect to the advertising and promo-
tion of cigarettes" because the imposition of common law liability
would conflict with federal law 'e After multiple remands on
issues not pertaining to the preemptive effect of either the 1965
Act or the 1969 Act, the Supreme Court granted certiorari "to
consider the preemptive effect of the federal statutes." 1 '
Preliminary Holding Regarding Express and Implied
Preemptin
The Supreme Court's opinion in Cipollone began with a reiter-
ation of the basic principles of traditional preemption analysis,
including the effect of the Supremacy Clause,"0 2 the presump-
tion against preemption of the states' historic police powers by
the federal government,' and the importance of congressional
intent in preemption analysis.' 4 The Court recognized another
well-established principle of traditional preemption analysis
when it stated that "Congress' intent may be 'explicitly stated in
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1969).
98. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2614.
99. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789
F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), affd in part, rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
100. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
101. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2615.
102. "Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States
'shall be the supreme Law of the Land; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.'" Id. at 2617 (citation omitted).
103. "Consideration of issues ansmg under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the
assumption that the historic police power of the States [are] not to be superseded
by Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Id.
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
104. "Accordingly, '[tihe purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of preemp-
tion analysis." Id. (citation omitted).
1995] 797
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure
and purpose.""' 5 The Court departed significantly from tradi-
tional preemption analysis, however, when it declared that in-
plied preemption analysis should not be undertaken where Con-
gress has included in the statute an express preemption prov-
sion. In the words of the Court:
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and
has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly
addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a
"reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to
state authority," "there is no need to infer congressional in-
tent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions"
of the legislation. Congress' enactment of a provision de-
fining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters
beyond that reach are not pre-empted.'
Thus, in one paragraph, the Court declared traditional implied
preemption analysis redundant when a federal statute explicitly
contemplates some form of preemption of the states' historic
police power.
Preemption by the 1965 Act
The 1965 Act was designed to promote two discrete and some-
times competing federal objectives: (1) adequately informnng the
public that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health and
(2) protecting the national economy from the burden imposed by
diverse, nonuniform and confusing cigarette labeling and adver-
tising regulations."0 7 Addressing the first objective, section 4 of
the 1965 Act0 8 required the following warmng to be affixed on
every package of cigarettes sold in the country- "Caution: Ciga-
rette Smoking May Be Hazardous To Your Health." 9 To the
latter objective, section 5 of the 1965 Act, entitled "Preemption,"
provided:
105. Id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
106. Id. at 2618 (citations omitted).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1965).
108. Id. § 1333.
109. Id.
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(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than
the statement required by Section 1333 of this title shall be
required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be
required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this
chapter.'10
In its express preemption analysis in Cipollone, the Court
held that Congress spoke "precisely and narrowly""' in enact-
ing the preemption provision of the 1965 Act. Justice Stevens'
analysis of the 1965 Act, representing a majority of seven Justic-
es, reasoned that the word "statement" in section 5 of the
1965 Act included only legislative enactments, as evidenced by
the fact that section 5(a) of that Act specifically referred to the
congressionally-mandated warning statement identified in sec-
tion 4 of that Act.1 The majority opimon's express preemption
analysis thus concluded that "on their face, these provisions
merely prohibited state and federal rule-making bodies from
mandating particular cautionary statements on cigarette labels
(§ 5(a)) or in cigarette advertisements (§ 5(b)).""
Given the Court's preliinary holding regarding the preemp-
tive reach of explicit preemption provisions, the majority's con-
sideration of the 1965 Act arguably should have ended with that
conclusion. Nonetheless, the Court elaborated upon its reasomng
in a portion of the opimon which bears remarkable resemblance
to an implied preemption analysis.' Initially, the Court stated
that such a narrow interpretation of the explicit preemption
provisions was appropriate given the presumption against the
preemption of historic state police powers."' Secondly, the
Court reasoned that a congressionally-promulgated "particular
warning does not automatically pre-empt a regulatory field.""'
110. Id. § 1334.
111. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
112. Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
113. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Perhaps most significantly, the Court held that "there is no
general, inherent conflict between federal preemption of state
warning requirements and the continued vitality of state com-
mon law damages actions."11 This reasoning led the Court to
conclude that none of Cipollone's common law damages claims
against Liggett was preempted by the relevant provisions of the
1965 Act.
Preemptin by the 1969 Act
The 1969 Act amended the above provisions of the 1965 Act in
two apparently significant ways.'19 First, section 4 of the 1969
Act changed the wording of the congressionally-mandated warn-
ing statement to read: 'Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your
Health."2 ' Perhaps more germane to the present issue, section
5(b) of the 1965 Act was amended by the 1969 Act to read as fol-
lows: "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under state law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this act."21
In his express preemption analysis of the 1969 Act, Justice
Stevens, writing for the plurality,'22 focused on the manner in
which the 1969 Act changed the language of the 1965 Act. In
particular, the plurality found the substitution of the phrase
"requirement[s] or prohibition[s] imposed under State
law""'23 for the term "statements"24 and the substitution of
the phrase "with respect to the advertising or promotion""25 for
the phrase "in the advertising"'26  to signify a "much
118. Id.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1969).
120. Id.
121. Id. § 1334(b).
122. Joining Justice Stevens were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Jus-
tice O'Connor. Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1969).
124. Id. § 1334(b) (1965).
125. Id. (1969)
126. Id. (1965).
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broader"27 congressional intent to preempt state law
Addressing the words "requirement or prohibition,"1 in the
former phrase, the plurality stated:
[Cipollone] argues that common law damages actions do not
impose "requirement[s] or prohibition[s]" and that Congress
intended only to trump "state statute[s], mjunction[s], or
executive pronouncement[s]." We disagree; such an analysis
is at odds both with the plain words of the 1969 Act and with
the general understanding of common law damages actions.
The phrase "[no requirement or prohibition" sweeps broadly
and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and
common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass
obligations that take the form of common law rules. As we
have noted in another context, "state regulation can be as
effectively exerted through an award of damages as through
some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compen-
sation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of
governing conduct and controlling policy ""2
Furthermore, according to the plurality opinion, common law
damages actions are tantamount to the imposition of a require-
ment or prohibition because they are "premised on the existence
of a legal duty" 3 ' In this respect, the plurality distinguished
the language of the 1969 Act from that of the 1965 Act. Follow-
ing Justice Stevens' reasomng, no state common law claim
would require a cigarette vendor to attach a specifically worded
warning statement to cigarette packages or advertisements m
contravention of section 5 of the 1965 Act. Therefore, the 1965
Act did not preempt state common law claims.' ' On the other
hand, a state common law claim could impose liability based on
the existence of a legal duty that could be construed as an "af-
firmative requirement[] or negative prohibition G."'32 Thus, the
127. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1969).
129. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2620 (footnote omitted) (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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1969 Act preempts at least some state common law claims.133
In interpreting the words "under State law,"'34 the plurality
also rejected Cipollone's claim that such language preempts only
positive enactments by state rule-making bodies:
[W]e have recognized the phrase "state law" to include com-
mon law as well as statutes and regulations. Indeed just last
Term, the Court stated that the phrase "all other law, includ-
ing State and municipal law" "does not admit of [a] distmnc-
tion between positive enactments and common-law rules
of liability -135
Thus, the plurality in Cipollone apparently rejected the
"choice of reaction" theory established in Ferebee by concluding
that state common law claims are part of the rubric of state law
and, as such, potentially impose a state legal requirement.
Finding that state common law damages claims potentially
impose some state legal requirements or prohibitions did not
mean, however, that all of Cipollone's state common law claims
were preempted by section 5(b) of the 1969 Act.'36 Rather, in
keeping with the presumption against preemption, the plurality
narrowly interpreted the language of section 5(b) so that only
those claims that imposed certain types of requirements or pro-
hibitions were preempted by the 1969 Act. Specifically, the plu-
rality announced the following test:
The central inquiry in each case is straightforward: we ask
whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common
law damages action constitutes a "requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health imposed under State law
with respect to advertising or promotion," giving that
clause a fair but narrow reading."7
The plurality then applied this test to each of the four types of
claims Cipollone had asserted against Liggett."'
133. Id.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1969).
135. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2620 (citing Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. American
Train Dispatchers, Ill S. Ct. 1156 (1991)).
136. Id. at 2621.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Cipollone alleged two kinds of failure-to-warn claims:" 9 (1)
negligence in testing, research, sale, promotion, and advertise-
ment of cigarettes and (2) failure to provide "adequate warnings
of the health consequences of cigarette smoling."4 ° The plural-
ity concluded that the failure to warn claims based on a state
common law duty related to advertising were preempted, but the
failure to warn claims based on actions unrelated to the adver-
tisement or promotion of cigarettes, such as testing or research,
were not preempted.'
The plurality further held that Cipollone's breach of express
warranty claim was not preempted because "[a] manufacturer's
liability for breach of an express warranty derives from, and is
measured by, the terms of that warranty Accordingly, the
'requirements' imposed by an express warranty claim are not
'imposed under State law,' but rather imposed by the warran-
tor.'
142
Cipollone also alleged two kinds of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion claims: (1) that Liggett's advertising neutralized the ef-
fect of the congressionally-mandated warning statement and (2)
that Liggett falsely represented or concealed a material fact.14
The plurality concluded that the first of these claims was the
converse of the failure to warn claim-based on a common law
prohibition related to advertisement and promotion of ciga-
rettes-and was therefore preempted by section 5(b) of the 1969
Act.'45 Interestingly, the Court viewed the second fraudulent
misrepresentation claim as based on a general duty not to make
false or misleading statements, not on a duty related to the
advertisement or promotion of cigarettes. 46 Thus, the plurality
held that Cipollone's second fraudulent misrepresentation claim
was not preempted by section 5(b) of the 1969 Act. 47
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2621-22.
142. Id. at 2622.
143. Id. at 2623.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2623-24.
147. Id.
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Lastly, the plurality applied the same logic to Cipollone's
conspiracy to defraud claim as it had to the second of Cipollone's
fraudulent misrepresentation claims and declared that the con-
spiracy to defraud claim was based on a general duty not to
conspire to commit fraud, not on a duty related to the advertise-
ment or promotion of cigarettes. 148 Accordingly, the plurality
opinion held that Cipollone's conspiracy to defraud claim was
not preempted by section 5(b) of the 1969 Act.'49
Justice Blackmun's Opinion
In his separate opinion, Justice Blackmun endorsed the
plurality's preliminary holding that implied preemption analysis
is unnecessary where Congress has included express preemption
provisions in legislation:
Where, as here, Congress has included in legislation a specif-
ic provision addressing-and indeed, entitled-pre-emption,
the Court's task is one of statutory interpretation-only to
"identify the domain expressly pre-empted" by the provision.
We resort to principles of implied pre-emption only
when Congress has been silent with respect to preemp-
tion.'
Justice Blackmun also recognized the Court's longstanding ad-
herence to the presumption against preemption by requiring
"clear and unambiguous evidence"'5' to justify federal preemp-
tion of state regulating authority 152
148. Id. at 2624.
149. Id. at 2624-25.
150. Id. at 2625 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
plurality opinion).
151. Id.
152. As Justice Blackmun noted:
I further agree with the Court that we cannot find the state common-law
damages claims at issue in this case pre-empted by federal law in the
absence of clear and unambiguous evidence that Congress intended that
result. See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746
(1981) ("Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic
assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law"); [Florida
Lime &] Avocado Growers [Inc., v. Paul], 373 U.S. [132], 146-47
(1963) ("[W]e are not to conclude that Congress legislated the ouster of
this [state] statute in the absence of an unambiguous congressional
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Applying his preemption methodology in the context of the
cigarette acts at issue in Cipollone, Justice Blackmun also
agreed with the plurality's conclusion that common law failure-
to-warn claims were not preempted by the 1965 Act. Specifically,
Justice Blackmun believed that the preemption provisions in the
1965 Act, given their ordinary interpretation, could only mean
"that States are prohibited merely from 'mandating particular
cautionary statements in cigarette advertisements.""53 Like
the plurality, then, Justice Blackmun concluded that the pre-
emption provisions of the 1965 Act preempted only positive en-
actments by state legislatures or administrative agencies and
not common law damages claims."
Justice Blackmun found the plurality's conclusions with re-
spect to the 1969 Act "little short of baffling" 5' in light of the
plurality's preemption methodology and its disposition with
respect to the 1965 Act. In his view, the same plain meaning
test that the plurality applied to the language of the 1965 Act
should also have been applied to the language of the 1969
Act. '6 Justice Blackmun cited dictionary definitions of the
language in question and concluded that the "terms suggest, if
anything, specific actions mandated or disallowed by a formal
governing authority"'57 To clarify that such mandates did not
include common law claims, he emphasized the indirect, non-
compulsory, and compensatory regulatory impact of common law
claims. ' In other words, he endorsed the "choice of reaction"
theory elucidated in Ferebee. Thus, for Justice Blackmun, "the
modified language of [the 1969 Act] no more 'clearly' or
'manifestly' exhibit[ed] an intent to pre-empt state common-law
mandate to that effect"); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor
Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1947) ("Any indulgence in construc-
tion should be in favor of the States, because Congress can speak with
drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure full federal authority, com-
pletely displacing the States") (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2625-26.
153. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2626.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2627.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2627-28.
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damages actions than did the language of the 1965 Act."59
Justice Blackmun supported his interpretation of the plain
meaning of the language in the preemption provisions of the
1969 Act with an analysis of the relevant legislative history, in
which he found "no suggestion that Congress intended to
expand the scope of the pre-emption provision when it amended
the statute in 1969. "16o
Lastly, Justice Blackmun criticized the plurality opimon for
distinguishing the plaintiff's claims which rely upon a state law
"requirement or prohibition with respect to advertising
or promotion" 6' of cigarettes from those based upon more gen-
eral duties, such as the general duty not to deceive or to con-
spire to commit fraud. 162 According to Justice Blackmun, the
plurality artificially shifted the level of generality with which it
considered the plaintiff's individual claims, 63 resulting in a
"crazy quilt of pre-emption that Congress surely could not
have intended."1"
Justice Scalia's Opinion
Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Scalia castigated the plurality
for taking a seemingly self-contradictory middle position in
Cipollone.65 However, whereas Justice Blackmun agreed with
159. Id. at 2627.
160. Id. at 2629.
161. Id. at 2621.
162. See id. at 2623-24.
163. In Justice Blackmun's words:
[T]he Court states that fraudulent misrepresentation claims are not
"predicated on a duty 'based on smoking and health' but rather on a
more general obligation-the duty not to deceive," and therefore are not
pre-empted by the 1969 Act. Yet failure to warn claims-which
could just as easily be described as based on a "more general obligation"
to inform consumers of known risks-implicitly are found to be "based on
smoking and health" and are declared pre-empted.
Id. at 2631 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting plural-
ity opinion).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The life-
span of [the plurality's new pre-emption methodology] may have been blessedly brief,
inasmuch as the opinion that gives it birth in Part I proceeds to ignore it in Part
V, by adjudging at least some of the common-law tort claims at issue here pre-
empted.").
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the plurality's approach to preemption questions,'1 6 Justice
Scalia found the plurality's holdings in this regard "extraordi-
nary and unprecedented."" Justice Scalia's criticism of the
majority's preemption approach is discussed more fully be-
low 16
Justice Scalia's belief that the presumption against preemp-
tion is inoperative in express preemption and implied "conflict"
analyses 16' eradicates the plurality's policy rationale for strict-
ly construing such express statutory provisions. Accordingly,
Justice Scalia argued in Cipollone that express preemption pro-
visions should be given their ordinary meaning, whether broad
or narrow, so as to most nearly effectuate congressional in-
tent. '7 Applying this methodology for statutory construction to
the ambiguous language of the cigarette acts at issue in
Cipollone, Justice Scalia posited that "[tihe test for pre-emption
in this setting should be one of practical compulsion, i.e., wheth-
er the law practically compels the manufacturers to engage in
behavior that Congress has barred the States from prescribing
directly "'
7
Like Justice Blackmun,'72 Justice Scalia discerned no reason
to interpret the language of the 1965 Act differently from that of
the 1969 Act.77 Also like Justice Blackmun, Justice Scalia cas-
tigated the plurality for making artificial distinctions among the
plaintiffs claims based on varying levels of generality 74 How-
166. Id. at 2625 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. Id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. See infra notes 253-70 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
170. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
171. Id. at 2637.
172. Id. at 2627 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting m part).
173. Id. at 2634-35 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting m part).
174. In Justice Scalia's words:
Tins analysis is suspect, to begin with, because the plurality is unwilling
to apply it consistently. As Justice Blackmun cogently explains, if
New Jersey's common-law duty to avoid false statements of material
fact is not "based on smoking and health," the same must be said of
New Jersey's common-law duty to warn about a product's dangers.
Id. at 2636 (citing td. at 2631 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
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ever, Justice Scalia's ultimate conclusion directly contradicted
that of Justice Blackmun. Justice Scalia found that the 1969 Act
completely preempted the plaintiffs claims and that the 1965
Act preempted the failure-to-warn claims.'75
Summary of the Cipollone Decision
As the foregoing analysis suggests, the Court's ultimate dispo-
sition in Cipollone is confusing, if not self-contradictory A bloc
of seven Justices76 endorsed a new methodology for preemp-
tion issues77 and, applying that new methodology to the 1965
Act, found no preemption of any of the petitioner's state common
law tort claims. 7 ' Yet four members of the same bloc of Justic-
es, 17 9 purportedly applying the same methodology to a similar-
ly worded 1969 Act, found preemption of the petitioner's state
common law tort claims based on a failure to warn and neutral-
ization of federal warning labels. 80 The plurality was joined in
this latter holding by the two Justices"' who dissented from
the Court's formulation of a new preemption methodology and
the Court's holding with respect to the 1965 Act.'82 Given this
curious combination of authority, the merit of Justice Scalia's
and Justice Blackmun's somewhat prophetic criticisms of the
plurality opinion is apparent.'83
175. Id. at 2632.
176. Justices Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
177. See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
178. Id. at 2619.
179. Justices Rehnquist, White, Stevens, and O'Connor.
180. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2625.
181. Justices Scalia and Thomas.
182. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
183. See id. at 2638 ("[The] questions raised by today's decision will fill the law-
books for years to come."); id. at 2631 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) ("I can only speculate as to the difficulty lower courts will encounter in
attempting to implement the Court's decision.").
808 [Vol. 36:783
THE CASE AGAINST FIFRA PREEMPTION
Cipollone's Impact on the FIFRA Preemption Controversy
Academic Reaction
The plurality's decision has led to considerable speculation
among legal commentators"M as to the applicability of the pre-
emption principles outlined in Cipollone to numerous products
liability industries regulated by federal statutes such as FIFRA,
the Alcoholic Beverage Labeling Act,'85 the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,"86 the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act,"3 7 and the Medical Device Amendments of
1976. 1' In the context of FIFRA specifically, the commentators
appear to fall into one of two separate camps: those who are un-
certain (or at least non-committal) as to the effect Cipollone will
have on the FIFRA preemption debate 89 and those who con-
clude that the language of the 1969 Act is sufficiently similar to
that of FIFRA so as to require a finding of preemption in the
FIFRA context based on the reasomng of Cipollone."9 °
Judical Reactin
As one might expect, the judicial reaction to the Cipollone
decision in the FIFRA context has not been so one-sided. Al-
though the majority of courts that have addressed the issue of
FIFRA preemption after Cipollone have found that the federal
legislation preempts state common law actions based on a fail-
ure-to-warn,' 9 ' at least two federal district courts in different
184. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 5; Smith & Coonrod, supra note 5; Boeh, supra
note 5; Brown, supra note 5.
185. 27 U.S.C. §§ 213-219a (1988).
186. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
187. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
188. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified in part at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-
360k (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)).
189. See Mary P Benz & Derek J. Meyer, Express Federal Preemption: Where Is It
After Cipollone?, 59 DEF. COUNS. J. 491 (1992); J. Stratton Shartel, Cipollone's Effect
on Other Preemption Cases Defies Prediction, INSIDE LITIG., Aug. 1992, at 1 (1992);
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 347 (1992).
190. See Smith & Coonrod, supra note 5; Boeh, supra note 5; Brown, supra note 5.
191. See MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); Worm v.
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circuits have found no preemption of failure to warn claims.192
Moreover, the analyses in some of the decisions finding preemp-
tion suggest some confusion over key holdings in the Cipollone
decision. 193
Cases Finding Preemption After Cipollone
The Tenth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to
consider the FIFRA preemption issue in the wake of Cipollone.
In Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers,
Inc. (Arkansas-Platte IH, 1" a landowner filed suit against a
chemical manufacturer for environmental damage to property
allegedly caused by the application of the defendant's product by
American Cyananmd Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993) (Worm II); King v. E.I. Dupont
De Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir.), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 490 (1993);
Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985
F.2d 516 (11th Cir.) (Papas III), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993) (Papas IV); Ar-
kansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 (10th
Cir.) (Arkansas-Platte III), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993) (Arkansas-Platte IV); In
re Dupont-Benlate Litig., 859 F Supp. 619 (D.P.R. 1994); Kenepp v. American Ed-
wards Lab., 859 F Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Pitts v. Dow Chem. Co., 859 F Supp.
543 (M.D. Ala. 1994); Jillson v. Vermont Log Bldgs., Inc., 857 F Supp. 985 (D.
Mass. 1994); Eppler v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 860 F Supp. 1391 (W.D. Mo. 1994);
Bingham v. Terminix Int'l Co., 850 F Supp. 516 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Allen v. Pennco
Eng. Co., 847 F Supp. 1315 (M.D. La. 1994). Trinity Mtn. Seed Co. v. MSD Agunet,
844 F Supp. 597 (D. Idaho 1994); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pooltime Prod. Inc., 846 F
Supp. 499 (E.D. La. 1994); Quad R Farms v. American Cyananid Co., 840 F Supp.
694 (D. Minn. 1993); Kinser v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 837 F Supp. 217 (W.D. Ky. 1993);
DerGazanan v. Dow Chem. Co., 836 F Supp. 1429 (W.D. Ark. 1993); Kolich v. Sysco
Corp., 825 F Supp. 959 (D. Kan. 1993); Levesque v. Miles Inc., 816 F Supp. 61
(D.N.H. 1993); Casper v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 806 F Supp. 903 (E.D.
Wash. 1992); Gibson v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 92-30, 1992 WL 404681 (E.D. Ky. Oct.
19, 1992); Jordan v. Southern Wood Piedmont Co., 805 F Supp. 1575 (S.D. Ga.
1992); Brennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 613 So.2d 131 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993); ISK Biotech
Corp. v. Douberly, 640 So.2d 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); ICI Americas, Inc. v.
Banks, 440 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Moody v. Chevron Chem. Co., 505
N.W.2d 900 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931 (Nev. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1944 (1993); Warner v. American Fluoride Corp., 616
N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div. 1994).
192. See MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 813 F Supp. 1258 (E.D. Tex. 1993) reu'd, 27
F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); Couture v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 804 F Supp. 1298 (D.
Mont. 1992); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
193. See infra notes 194-246 and accompanying text.
194. 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993).
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the plaintiffs predecessor."' The Tenth Circuit affirmed its
prior decision, on remand from the Supreme Court, and held
that "Cipollone does not require a conclusion different than the
one we reached initially""' Nonetheless, although Cipollone
may not have changed the Tenth Circuit's ultimate conclusion
between Arkansas-Platte I and Arkansas-Platte III, it certainly
changed the nature of the analysis undertaken by the court to
decide the issue. In Arkansas-Platte I, the court found that
FIFRA impliedly preempts state common law tort actions be-
cause such claims would (1) conflict with the EPA's authority
under FIFRA to evaluate and approve labeling standards, (2)
hinder the purpose of achieving uniformity in labeling, and (3)
interfere with federal methods of achieving a statutory pur-
pose.'97 In contrast, in Arkansas-Platte III the court engaged
only in an express preemption analysis.' Presumably, this
change in the Tenth Circuit's analysis is the result of the lan-
guage in Cipollone that implied preemption analysis is redun-
dant where a federal statute contains express preemption provi-
sions. 9 Indeed, in a case with a procedural history almost
identical to that of Arkansas-Platte, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals read Cipollone to require that only express preemp-
tion analysis be applied to statutes like FIFRA that contain
express preemption provisions."' Similarly, four other circuit
courts that have considered the FIFRA preemption issue after
195. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Stream Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959
F.2d 158, 159 (loth Cir.) (Arkansas-Platte I), vacated sub. noma., Arkansas-Platte &
Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992) (Arkansas-Platte II).
196. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Stream Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981
F.2d 1177, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 1992) (Arkansas-Platte III), cert. dented, 114 S. Ct. 60
(1993).
197. See Arkansas-Platte I, 959 F.2d at 161-62.
198. Specifically, the court compared the language of FIFRA § 136v(b) (states "shall
not impose any requirements") and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969 § 5(b) ("[n]o requirement or prohibition shall be imposed"), concluding,
"[wle believe the prohibition of 'any' requirement is the functional equivalent of
'no' requirement. We see no difference between the operative effect of the two acts."
Arkansas-Platte III, 981 F.2d at 1179.
199. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
200. "To determine FIFRA's pre-emption of the [plaintiffs'] claims we will 'only
identify the domain expressly pre-empted' " Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516
(11th Cir.) (Papas III), cert. dented, 114 S. Ct. 300 (1993) (Papas IV).
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Cipollone, have limited their analyses to the express language of
FIFRA section 136v(b). °'
In Worm v. American Cyanamid Co. (Worm II),1°2 the plain-
tiff farmers brought suit because the defendant's herbicide alleg-
edly retarded crop growth for a period significantly longer than
the period indicated on the label of the product.23 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a FIFRA preemption decision,
declining to find express preemption because "Congress has not
failed to make such preemption clear when it desired to do
so) 204 In Worm II, the Fourth Circuit recognized the new stan-
dard for preemption analysis announced by the Supreme Court
in Cipollone: "Articulating a specific approach to interpreting a
statute that expressly addresses preemption, the Court limited
the task to first determining whether the relevant provisions
reliably indicate congressional intent with regard to preemption
of state authority, and second, if so, to interpreting the express
language."2 5 Despite this accurate summation of one of the
key holdings in Cipollone,0 6 the court in Worm 11 concluded
that the "restrictive analysis [in Cipollone] would appear to
require no change in the analysis of Worm I ;)2o7 Yet,
Worm I was decided on the basis of an "implied conflict" preemp-
tion analysis,08 an approach that would appear to be inappli-
cable to FIFRA cases after Cipollone because FIFRA contains an
express preemption provision.
In MacDonald v. Monsanto Co.,29 a chemical sprayer filed
suit against a chemical manufacturer for personal injuries alleg-
201. See MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); Worm v. Amer-
ican Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993) (Worm II); Shaw v. Dow Brands,
Inc., 994 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993); King v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d
1346 (ist Cir. 1993).
202. 5 F.3d 744.
203. Id. at 745-46.
204. Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1305 (4th Cir.) (Worm I), on
remand, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 441 (D. Md. 1992), affd, 5 F.3d 744
(4th Cir. 1993).
205. Worm II, 5 F.3d at 747
206. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
207. Worm 11, 5 F.3d at 747
208. Worm I, 970 F.2d at 1306.
209. 27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994).
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edly caused by exposure to the defendant's herbicide.21° The
Fifth Circuit relied on Cipollone to hold that FIFRA preempts
state common law damage claims concerning the improper label-
ing of herbicides.2"' The court engaged in an express preemp-
tion analysis finding that the "clear language of the statute"
required a finding of preemption." 2 Tins decision reversed the
district court, which had criticized the Tenth Circuit's finding of
express preemption in Arkansas-Platte IN"3 on the grounds
that the circuit court failed to recognize Cipollone's emphasis
"that there is no inherent conflict between federal preemption of
state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state
common law damage actions.""4 Moreover, the district court
criticized the decision in Arkansas-Platte III because it failed to
recognize significant differences between the language in the
Cigarette Acts and FIFRA."5 The district court also criticized
the Tenth Circuit's rationale that state common law claims
would conflict with the congressional intent to achieve uniforni-
ty in the labeling of chemical products through FIFRA.216
State courts also have grappled with the effect of Cipollone on
FIFRA preemption cases. In Davidson v. Velszcol Chemical
Corp. ,2 17 the first "state case to address the issue after
Cipollone,"8 the plaintiffs filed suit to recover for injuries al-
legedly caused by the application of the defendant's termite com-
pound to the foundation of their home.1 9 The Nevada Supreme
Court recognized that after Cipollone, "[w]here Congress has
expressly provided for pre-emption, resort to the implied pre-
emption doctrines is unnecessary; instead, the court need only
210. Id. at 1022-23.
211. Id. at 1024-25.
212. Id.
213. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnersup v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d
1177 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993); see supra notes 194-99 and ac-
companying text.
214. MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 813 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
215. Id.
216. Id., see infra note 326 and accompanying text. Although MacDonald has been
overruled, the district court's analysis m that case is indicative of the difficulty low-
er courts have encountered m interpreting Cipollone.
217. 834 P.2d 931 (Nev. 1992).
218. See Recent Case, supra note 6, at 964.
219. Davidson, 834 P.2d at 932.
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determine the scope of the pre-emption."22 ° In its express pre-
emption analysis, the court stated that FIFRA section 136v(b)
makes no specific mention of state common law claims and con-
cluded that "[blecause Congress has expressly pre-empted com-
mon law in other pre-emption clauses, Congress' silence cannot
be ignored-it is inimical to a finding of express pre-emp-
tion."2
2 1
Given the court's accurate summation of one of the key hold-
ings in Cipollone,222 the Nevada Supreme Court's decision
should not have gone any further, and the plaintiff in that case
should have prevailed. Nevertheless, the court went on to find
common law claims barred by FIFRA because of an "implied
field" preemption and an "implied conflict" preemption.2' The
court attempted to explain its apparent discord with Cipollone in
the following statement: "Our opinion is consonant with
Cipollone in that we address implied pre-emption only after
concluding that FIFRA does not expressly pre-empt such
claims "224 Thus, in Davidson, the court interpreted
Cipollone to require an express preemption analysis "in addition
to-rather than to the exclusion of-an implied preemption anal-
ysis."2 25
Yowell v. Chevron Chemical Co.,226 decided by a Missouri
Court of Appeals within three weeks of Cipollone, was a wrong-
ful death action against a pesticide manufacturer. The court in
Yowell relied heavily on Papas I and Arkansas-Platte I to con-
clude that "FIFRA impliedly preempts state common law tort
suits against manufacturers of EPA-registered pesticides to the
220. Id.
221. Id. at 934; see also Domestic Housing and Int'l Recovery and Fin. Stability
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z-17(d), 1715z-18(e) (1988) (preempting "State constitution,
statute, court decree, common law, rule, or public policy"); Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988) (preempting claims "under the common law or statutes of any
State"); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("The term 'State law' includes all laws, decisions, rules,
regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State.").
222. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
223. Davidson, 834 P.2d at 934-37.
224. Id. at 933 n.2.
225. See Recent Case, supra note 6, at 964,
226. 836 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
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extent that such actions are based on claims of inadequate label-
ing."2
27
Although the ultimate dispositions of these federal and state
cases are in harmony, the differences in their approaches to the
FIFRA preemption question suggest that Justice Blackmun was
correct in forecasting the difficulty that lower courts would have
in attempting to apply the Cipollone holding in other preemption
contexts.
22
Cases Finding No Preemptin After Cipollone
One of the first federal cases to address the FIFRA labeling
preemption issue after Cipollone was Burke v. Dow Chemical
Co. 229 In that case, the parents of two children sued the manu-
facturers of an insecticide, alleging that the mother's exposure to
the active ingredient during her pregnancies caused her children
to have brain damage." Dow claimed that the suit was pre-
empted by FIFRA and its corresponding regulations."s
The district court in Burke began its FIFRA labeling preemp-
tion analysis by noting that the language of FIFRA expressly
grants the states considerable regulatory powers with respect to
the sale and use of pesticides," 2 while prohibiting them from
directly imposing labeling requirements." In the district
court's opimon, the language of FIFRA is broader than that of
the 1965 Cigarette Act but not as broad as that of the 1969
Cigarette Act.' Because of the "expansive" regulatory powers
227. Id. at 66 (quoting Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1026 (11th Cir. 1991)).
228. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
229. 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
230. Id. at 1130.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1136; see also 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1988); supra notes 29-31 and accom-
panying text.
233. Burke, 797 F Supp. at 1136; see also 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).
234. The fact that the provision speaks only to labeling and packaging causes
it to resemble the 1965 cigarette act's provision that "no statement relat-
ing to smoking or health shall be required on any cigarette .pack-
age." Unlike the 1965 act, however, FIFRA bars states from impos-
ing "requirements" (rather than requiring statements), a usage which the
Cipollone Court took to have a broader preemptive effect
Burke, 797 F Supp. at 1140.
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granted to the states in section 136v(a), however, the court was
especially reluctant to read section 136v(b) broadly- "While
courts must ordinarily construe preemption clauses narrowly,
they must be especially cautious when Congress itself has iden-
tified an extremely broad area of authorized state conduct." 5
Accordingly, the district court in Burke interpreted the FIFRA
preemption provision more narrowly than most courts which
have considered the issue. Specifically, the court determined:
[I]f EPA-approved labels were in fact affixed to the relevant
containers, plaintiffs may not claim that defendants' products
were mislabeled. If, however, warnings to the trade, warnings
apart from labels or packaging, limitation on sales to profes-
sionals, or other protections falling generally within the
ambit of warnings should have been used when the content of
the label was fixed by EPA there remains a liability question
for the trier of fact.
36
One interpretation of this holding is that the district court in
Burke found preemption of government misfeasance claims al-
leging that the EPA mislabeled the product based upon the
product-specific information provided to the Agency, but found
no preemption of common law manufacturer misfeasance claims
alleging that the manufacturer provided inadequate or inaccu-
rate product-specific information to the Agency
Despite "the directive in Cipollone to focus exclusively on
express preemption clauses, '  the court in Burke undertook
an implied preemption analysis for the sake of argument, and
concluded that FIFRA did not impliedly preempt the common
law failure-to-warn claims."' While noting analytical weak-
nesses on both sides of the debate,239 the district court ulti-
mately decided the implied preemption question on policy
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1141.
238. Id.
239. Specifically, the court recognized that the "choice of reaction" theory underlying
the anti-preemption decisions offers manufacturers no real choice, while also ac-
knowledging that the preemption of common law failure-to-warn claims would elimi-
nate any incentive for manufacturers to actively evaluate the adequacy of their la-
bels. Id.
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grounds: "The federalism issues are too important to warrant
foreclosing recovery to an injured party on a questionable theory
of implied preemption."4
In Couture v. Dow Chemical U.SA., 2" a federal district
court in Montana relied on Burke in finding no FIFRA preemp-
tion of common law failure-to-warn claims. In Couture, the
plaintiff asserted that exposure to the defendant's herbicides
resulted in his contraction of T-cell lymphoma.242 The defen-
dant contended that FIFRA preempted the claims." 3 The dis-
trct court reaffirmed one of its own pre-Cipollone FIFRA deci-
sions 244 and adopted the Ferebee "choice of reaction"
rationale.2 41 The court relied on Burke in the sense that it
found the "choice of reaction" interpretation of the express lan-
guage in FIFRA more appropriate than a broad reading of that
language, given (1) the expansive regulatory powers granted to
the states in section 136v(a) of FIFRA and (2) the Supreme
Court's directive in Cipollone to interpret preemption provisions
narrowly 24
6
Conclusin: Cipollone's Impact on the FIFRA Preemptin
Debate
The circuits were split with regard to FIFRA preemption prior
to the Cipollone decision. After Cipollone, the circuits remain
split, though considerably less dramatically Moreover, federal
and state courts have employed a hodgepodge of express and
implied preemption analyses in FIFRA cases decided in the
wake of Cipollone.
Part Two of this Note suggests an alternative to the preemp-
tion analysis outlined in Cipollon- and attempts to apply this
suggested analysis to FIFRA.
240. Id.
241. 804 F Supp. 1298 (D. Mont. 1992).
242. Id. at 1299.
243. Id.
244. Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks, 775 F Supp. 1339 (D. Mont.
1991), affd, 993 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1993).
245. Couture, 804 F Supp at 1300.
246. Id. at 1300-02.
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An Alternatwe to the Cipollone Preemption Analysis
Although there has been some confusion about the Supreme
Court's preemption methodology in Cipollone,247 most federal
and state courts that have addressed the preemptive effect of
federal statutes in the wake of Cipollone have recognized that a
majority of the Court 8 reformulated traditional preemption
methodology in that decision." 9 Specifically, the Court held
that (1) implied preemption analysis is unnecessary where Con-
gress has included in federal legislation a provision that, as "a
'reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state
authority," expressly addresses preemption' 0 and (2) express
preemption provisions deserve only a narrow interpretation, in
light of the strong presumption against preemption inherent in a
federal system of government. 1
The Need for Implied Preemption Analysis
The majority's rationale for eliminating implied preemption
analysis where federal legislation includes express preemption
provisions appears to be based on common sense: "Congress'
enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a
statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-
empted." 2 In other words, where Congress has taken the time
to enact a preemption section, Congress meant what it said and
nothing more.
In his separate opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the Court's
decision to ignore implied preemption analysis altogether where
federal legislation contains an express preemption provisin."
247. See, e.g., supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text (discussing Davidson v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931 (Nev. 1992)).
248. Justices Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
249. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
250. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2618 (1992) (quoting Malone
v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)).
251. Id. at 2617-21.
252. Id. at 2618.
253. Id. at 2633 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
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Justice Scalia apparently accepted the majority's new approach
to the extent that it rendered implied "field" preemption analysis
unnecessary in the face of an express preemption provision, for
the Court need not infer congressional intent from regulatory
structure where Congress itself has endeavored to codify it.254
Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's new rule, however,
to the extent that it precludes implied "conflict" preemption
analysisY5 He contended that such an approach would work
"mischief' in effectuating congressional intent.25 Extending
the Court's holding to its logical extreme, Justice Scalia noted
that such a rule would require "[tihe statute that says anything
about pre-emption [to] say everything."2 5'
Although the majority's formulation has obvious appeal in the
sense that it reserves default police powers to the states, the Su-
premacy Clause' 5 requires state powers to yield to conflicting
federal law Because of the Supremacy Clause, Justice Scalia's
position on the necessity of implied preemption analysis proves
more persuasive than the majority's new rule. Under the
majority's formulation, states could directly contravene federal
statutes merely because those statutes contain under-inclusive
preemption provisions. To illustrate the point, consider a hypo-
thetical federal statute that outlaws the sale and use of assault
rifles and contains the following preemption provision: "No state
shall regulate the sale of assault rifles as those weapons are
defined herein." Under the plurality's preemption approach, this
statute would not preempt a state law permitting the use of
assault rifles, despite the federal statute's express prohibition of
such use, because the preemption -provision does not expressly
preclude state regulation of the use of assault rifles. The majori-
ty would not undertake any implied preemption analysis in such
a case, since the federal legislation included an express preemp-
tion section. In contrast, Justice Scalia's approach would result
254. "The existence of an express pre-emption provision tends to contradict any
inference that Congress intended to occupy a field broader than the statute's express
language defines." Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2634.
258. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see supra note 34.
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in a finding of preemption. Although the preemption provision in
the federal statute would not expressly preclude a state from
allowing the use of assault rifles, it would impliedly preempt a
state law permitting use of assault rifles because such a law
would actually conflict with the federal legislation.259
A second reason that Justice Scalia's approach is more con-
vincing than the majority's approach is that under the latter,
Congress has more power to preempt state law when it is silent
than when it expressly addresses preemption in a particular
statute. In the foregoing assault rifle hypothetical, for instance,
if the federal legislation had not included any express preemp-
tion provision, the majority would inevitably find an implied
"conflict" preemption of the state law permitting use of assault
rifles. Yet, as noted above, the majority would not even under-
take this implied "conflict" analysis if the federal statute con-
tained an express preemption section.
The end result of the majority's formulation is hardly consis-
tent with the Supremacy Clause. As soon as Congress endeavors
to enact an express preemption provision, it is deprived of its
inherent power to supersede substantively conflicting state law;
and federal legislation is potentially eviscerated by state legisla-
tion, because only those state laws that conflict with the policies
enumerated in a preemption provision are precluded by that
provision, though other state legislation may conflict with poli-
cies of the statute not enumerated in the preemption provision.
The Presumption Against Preemptin
As noted above,26 a majority of the Cipollone Court recog-
nized a purportedly longstanding presumption against the pre-
emption of state police powers when it noted that
"[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause
'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States [are] not to be superseded by Federal Act unless
259. Cf. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1776 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("[Olur cases describe a contrary [preemption] rule: whether or not Con-
gress has used any special 'preemptive' language, state regulation must yield to the
extent it actually conflicts with Federal law.").
260. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."26 1 The
opinions in Cipollone also indicate that a majority of the Court
found this presumption significant in both express and implied
preemption analysis.2
Justice Scalia disagreed with the plurality's emphasis on the
presumption against preemption in express preemption anal-
ysis.263 While he recognized that such a presumption was ap-
propriate where Congress has remained silent with respect to
preemption and the Court consequently engages in an implied
"field" preemption analysis,2 Justice Scalia believed that such
a presumption "dissolves once there is conclusive evidence of
intent to pre-empt in the express words of the statute itself."265
Such language suggests that Justice Scalia considered the pre-
sumption against preemption rebuttable by Congress' enactment
of an express preemption provision, whereupon the only question
to be resolved was the extent to which Congress intended to dis-
place state law, not whether it intended to displace state
law 266
Justice Scalia also stated that the presumption against pre-
emption, coupled with the lack of any implied "conflict" analysis
where Congress enacted an express preemption provision, would
effectively function as a guarantee of congressional inaction.267
As Justice Scalia admonished:
When this second novelty is combined with the first, the
result is extraordinary- The statute that says anything about
pre-emption must say everything; and it must do so with
great exactitude, as any ambiguity concerning its scope will
be read m favor of preserving state power. If this is to be the
law, surely only the most sporting of congresses will dare to
say anything about pre-emption.2"
261. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
262. Id. at 2625-26 (Blackmun, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263. Id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
264. Id. at 2633.
265. Id. at 2632.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 2633-34.
268. Id. at 2634.
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Justice Scalia's objection to the emphasis placed upon the
presumption against preemption by the majority is well-taken
when the presumption is coupled with the lack of any implied
conflict analysis, for, as noted above, such an approach robs
Congress of some of the preemptive power it inherently possess-
es by virtue of the Supremacy Clause." 9 The presumption
against preemption would not create any disincentive to enact
express preemption provisions, however, if courts had to engage
in implied "conflict" analysis as well as express analysis. Under
such an approach, Congress would retain the same power to
preclude substantively conflicting state law after the enactment
of an express preemption provision that it had before enacting
such an express provision. Moreover, the enactment of an ex-
press preemption provision would be more likely than congres-
sional silence to serve as the "clear and manifest" evidence of
congressional intent to preempt that is required to override the
presumption.27 Rather than a deterrent, therefore, Congress
would have an affirmative incentive to enact express preemption
provisions if the presumption against preemption were coupled
with the requirement to engage in both an express preemption
analysis and an implied "conflict" preemption analysis.
The presumption against preemption is also consistent with
the most fundamental notions of federalism. As James Madison,
one of the most staunch advocates of a strong federal govern-
ment in the debate surrounding the ratification of our federal
constitution, observed:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefi-
nite. The powers reserved to the several States will ex-
tend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
269. See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607 (1991).
"Mere silence, in [the FIFRAI context, cannot suffice to establish a 'clear and mani-
fest purpose' to pre-empt local authority." Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and
the internal order, inprovement, and prosperity of the
State.27'
According the presumption against preemption great weight
might make the federal legislature's exercise of authority more
difficult by requiring Congress to speak precisely in express
preemption provisions. However, such a requirement only en-
hances legislative accountability, which serves as the foundation
of any democratic system of governance. Furthermore, such a
requirement would not emasculate federal legislative power, for
the Supreme Court has long recognized that "Congress can
speak with drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure full
federal authority, completely displacing the States."272
Requiring an implied "conflict" preemption analysis while
consistently recognizing the presumption against preemption
strikes the proper balance between the preeminence of the feder-
al government established by the Supremacy Clause and the
deference to the traditional police powers of the states inherent
in the most fundamental notions of federalism.
Applying the Alternative Preemption Analysis to FIFRA
FIFRA Does Not Expressly Preempt State Common Law
Claims
As noted above,2 ' the first step in an express preemption
analysis is to ascertain whether the express preemption provi-
sion at issue is "a 'reliable indicium of congressional intent with
respect to state authority ' "274 The FIFRA preemption
provisions27' appear to satsfy this requirement. Indeed, section
271. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
272. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767,
780 (1947).
273. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
274. Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2618 (1992) (quoting Malone
v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)).
275. See supra note 28.
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136v is itself entitled "Authority of States."276 It is difficult to
imagine a more 'reliable indicium of congressional intent with
respect to state authority"'277 than a federal statutory provision
so entitled.
Also as noted above,27 the presumption against preemption
requires clear and manifest evidence of congressional intent to
displace the police powers that have historically inhered- in the
states. Although section 136v(b) clearly and manifestly indicates
congressional intent to displace some state authority, it does not
clearly and manifestly exhibit an intent to displace all state
authority The language of section 136v(b) is ambiguous; it pro-
scribes state imposition of "any requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from those required under
this subchapter."279 This language does not explicitly proscribe
state common law actions, as other federal statutes have."'
Moreover, the regulations implementing the FIFRA regulatory
scheme repeatedly refer to the term "state" as the legislative,
executive or administrative authorities of the several states.281
276. 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1988).
277. Cippolone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (quoting Malone, 435 U.S. at 505).
278. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
279. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
280. See, e.g., Domestic Housing and International Recovery and Financial Stability
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1718(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("Mortgages insured pursuant
to this section shall not be subject to any State constitution, statute, court
decree, common law, rule, or public policy."); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §
301(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (preempting all legal rights "under the common law
or statutes of any State"); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("The term 'State law' includes all laws,
decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any
State."); see also Riden v. ICI Ams., Inc., 763 F Supp. 1500, 1505 n.11 (W.D. Mo.
1991).
281. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 162.151(j) (1993) (defining state for purposes of FIFRA as
state agency); id. § 166.20(a) (defining authority of the governor of a state, head of
a state agency, or official designee to grant exemptions under FIFRA); id. § 166.22
(requiring consultation with state governor in the determination of a state emergency
warranting exemption); id. § 166.40 (stating authority of the head of a state agency
or governor or official designee to issue crisis exemption); id. § 166.43(a) (requiring
state agency issuing crisis exemption to notify the EPA of such a determination); id.
§ 166.47 (requiring notification of state agency officials for crisis exemptions result-
ing in chemical residues); see also id. § 166.20(a) (referring to the authority of the
head of a state agency, the state governor, or a state's official designee to grant an
exemption under FIFRA for state emergencies).
THE CASE AGAINST FIFRA PREEMPTION
The only time the regulations explicitly mention state common
law claims is to convey the importance of such claims in the
FIFRA regulatory schemei--a reference that in fact assumes
the validity of state common law claims within that scheme. In
light of both the presumption against preemption and the fact
that Congress can speak with "drastic clarity" when it so
chooses," 3 it would certainly be reasonable to conclude that
section 136v(b) does not preempt state common law claims on its
face.
An analysis of the operative language in section 136v(b) yields
the same conclusion. As with the language of the cigarette acts
at issue in Cipollone, the dictionary definitions of the terms
"impose" and "requirements" in section 136v(b) "suggest, if any-
thing, specific actions mandated by a formal governing au-
thority "2  Thus, section 136v(b), if read to preempt anything
at all, should be read to preempt only affirmative enactments by
state legislatures and executive or adimmstrative agencies, not
state common law tort claims.
Such a reading of section 136v(b) is arguably at odds with the
language in Cipollone stating that "[als we noted in another con-
text, '[state] regulation can be as effectively exerted through an
award of damages as through some form of preventive relief.
The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to
be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling poli-
cy "',28 5 However, as Justice Blackmun astutely pointed out in
his separate opinion in Cipollone, the other context to which the
above language alludes is labor law, where the dominant federal
interest in regulating labor relations rebuts the presumption
282. Id. § 153.74(c) (referring to the manufacturer's responsibility to produce inci-
dent reports based on state law product liability claims).
283. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
284. Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2627 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring m part and dissenting in part); see WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UN-
ABRIDGED DICTIONARY 716, 1219 (1989) (defimng "impose" as "to lay on or set as
something to be borne, endured, obeyed, fulfilled, paid, etc." and "requirement" as "a
thing demanded or obligatory"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 755, 1304 (6th ed.
1990) (defimng "impose" as "[t]o levy or exact as by authority" and "require" as "[tlo
direct, order, demand, instruct, command, claim, compel, request, need, exact").
285. Cippolone, 112 S. Ct. at 2620 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)).
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against preemption and creates primary federal jurisdiction.'
No such dominant federal interest exists in the FIFRA context.
The purported government interest underlying section 136v(b) is
uniformity 7 Yet, uniformity in labeling does not exist under
the current FIFRA structure."m Because different manufactur-
ers of the same active chemical ingredient submit their own
proposed labels and directions for use to the EPA, identical com-
pounds may have different labels under the current FIFRA regu-
latory scheme."8 9 Given that the FIFRA preemption provision
lacks a dominant federal interest, the above language from
Garmon (as cited in Cipollones0 ) would not appear to apply in
a FIFRA preemption analysis.
Other passages in Cipollone, other recent Supreme Court
decisions, and fundamental principles of administrative law also
recognize the legitimacy of distinguishing between positive en-
actments of state legislative, executive, and administrative au-
thorities and state adjudicative pronouncements. When analyz-
ing the similarly-worded preemption provision of the 1965 Ciga-
rette Act, the Court in Cipollone stated that "there is no general,
inherent conflict between federal pre-emption of state warning
requirements and the continued vitality of state common law
damages actions."291 Similarly, in Goodyear Atomic Corp. v.
Miller,292 the Court recognized the difference between "direct
state regulation" and "the incidental regulatory effects" of state
common law damage awards, 93 concluding that "Congress may
286. Id. at 2628 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
287. Congress in fact amended section 136v(b) to include the sub-heading "Uniform-
ity" in 1978. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See Smith & Coonrod, su-
pra note 5, at 492.
288. See infra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
289. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 629 n.13 (1st Cir. 1987)
(discussing differences between FIFRA and the cigarette acts at issue in Cipollone).
"Under FIFRA, each manufacturer drafts a warning label for each product for EPA
approval. Thus, two manufacturers of the same regulated product may use different
labels of their own choosing, provided only that they obtain EPA approval." I&
290. See supra note 285.
291. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
292. 486 U.S. 174 (1988).
293. Id. at 185; see also Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2628 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing the direct effect of statutes and admunis-
trative regulations from the common law's indirect regulatory effect).
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reasonably determine that incidental regulatory pressure is
acceptable, whereas direct regulatory authority is not."2 94 In
another recent preemption case, English v. General Electric
Co.,295 the Court recognized that while common law damages
awards could alter behavior, "such an effect would be 'neither
direct nor substantial enough' to warrant preemption."296 In
addition, failing to distinguish between the regulatory nature of
positive enactments and common law judgments is akin to ignor-
ing the distinction between the rule-making and adjudicative ca-
pacities of an administrative agency that dates back almost
eighty years. 97
Although the Court was not persuaded in Cipollone by the
"choice of reaction" theory established by the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals' in Ferebee,"5 that theory may be more persuasive
in the FIFRA context. The cigarette acts at issue in Cipollone
mandated that manufacturers include a specific cautionary
statement on their cigarette packages. 9 Thus, a jury determi-
nation that such a warning was inadequate left the manufactur-
er with no choice and no means of escaping liability The manu-
facturers would have to either abide by the mandate of the Ciga-
rette Act and be found civilly liable to consumers or ignore the
federally mandated warning requirement and incur liability to
the government. FIFRA, by way of contrast, does not require
any particular warning statement; indeed, it allows manufac-
turers to actively engage in the process of determimng optimal
labeling by providing the EPA with relevant information regard-
ing the chemical product."'0 Therefore, when faced with a jury
294. Goodyear, 486 U.S. at 186; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 249-56 (1984) (distinguishing the authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion from the authority of states to impose tort liability upon those parties falling
under the scope of the Nuclear Regulatory Act).
295. 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
296. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2629 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting English, 496 U.S. at 85).
297. See BiMetallic v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (distinguishing
administrative rulemaking, whereby a public or a quasi-public procedure formulates
generally applicable policy, from administrative adjudication, whereby the adversarial
context of a specific controversy determines individual rights and duties).
298. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 107-09, and 119-20 and accompanying text.
300. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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determination finding inadequate labeling, a manufacturer has
exactly the choice outlined in Ferebee: (1) leave the label un-
changed and absorb the costs of common law damages claims or
(2) petition the EPA to alter the label.' Moreover, such a
choice is not "only notional" in the FIFRA context when one
considers that Congress enacted the statute to balance the need
for continued development of chemical products against the need
to protect humans, wildlife, and the environment from unreason-
ably adverse effects.'0 The fact that a state common law dam-
ages award could help effectuate this statutory purpose is fairly
evident. When damages are minor, a manufacturer required to
pay a relatively small amount of compensatory damages for
inadequate labeling will choose not to alter the product label
because the profit margin can absorb the additional costs. In
this instance the value of the product to society would outweigh
the harm. In contrast, a manufacturer required to pay an inordi-
nately large amount of compensatory damages will likely choose
either to remove the product from the stream of commerce or
modify the product label. In this instance, the harm of the prod-
uct would outweigh its value to society Thus, the "choice of
reaction" theory has mert in the FIFRA context.
Additionally, the language in section 136v(b) is more similar
to the language in the 1965 Cigarette Act at issue in Cipollone
(which the Court held did not preempt state common law
claims)... than it is to the language of the 1969 Cigarette Act
(which the Court held did preempt state common law
claims)."'4 The operative words in the preemption provision in
the 1965 Act are "'[njo statement shall be required ))Y305
The Court in Cipollone concluded that in this provision "Con-
gress spoke precisely and narrowly [O]n their face, these
provisions merely prohibited state and federal rule-making bod-
301. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5); see also S. REP No. 573, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166.
303. See supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 119-33 and accompanying text.
305. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2616-19 (citing Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1965)) (emphasis added).
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ies from mandating particular cautionary statements.""6 In
contrast, the operative language in the 1969 Act read, "'[n]o
requirement or prohibition shall be imposed under State
law );7307 The Court ultimately concluded that "[t]he phrase
'[no requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no
distinction between positive enactments and common law "308
The preemption provision in section 136v(b) would appear to
more closely resemble the language of the 1965 Act than the
1969 Act because that section precludes a state from effecting
"any requirements for labeling or packaging"' 9 and makes no
mention of state-imposed prohibitions.
Like the actual language of section 136v(b), the legislative
history is ambiguous with respect to state common law tort
claims. The discussion of section 136v(b) in the final Senate
Report is as follows: "Generally, the intent of the provision is to
leave to the States the authority to impose stricter regulation on
pesticides use than that required under the Act Subsection
(b) preempts any State labeling or packaging requirements dif-
fering from such requirements under the Act."31 This lack of
information has led two commentators to conclude that the legis-
lative history of this section of FIFRA "is, on the whole, not very
helpful in determining the preemptive effect of § 136v(b) on
state tort claims [because] there was little. controversy and,
hence, little discussion of the labeling question ,,31
A particularly compelling policy rationale suggests that sec-
tion 136v(b) does not expressly preempt state common law
claims. As Justice Blackmun noted in his separate opinion in
Cipollone, state common law tort claims serve a compensatory
purpose separate from their regulatory purpose.312 Indeed, the
primary purpose of state common law claims is compensatory,
306. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
307. Id. at 2617 (citing Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1965)).
308. Id. at 2620 (alteration in original).
309. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
310. S. REP. NO. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3993, 4021.
311. Smith & Coonrod, supra note 5, at 493.
312. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2628 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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while their regulatory purpose is only incidental.1 3 A finding
of express preemption would leave victims of chemical torts
without any effective remedy Such a devastating effect upon an
entire class of citizens should necessitate particularly clear and
manifest evidence of congressional intent. As the Court noted in
a similar context, "[the Atomic Energy Act's] silence takes on
added significance in light of Congress' failure to provide any
federal remedy for persons injured by such conduct. It is difficult
to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all
means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal con-
duct.
3 14
Congress clearly intended to preempt some state authority
when it enacted section 136v(b) of FIFRA. Yet, the language of
that section does not unequivocally preempt state common law
claims. The legislative history surrounding section 136v(b) is
similarly ambiguous. In light of (1) the presumption against
preemption, (2) the literal meaning of the statutory language, (3)
the lack of a dominant federal interest, (4) the merit of the
"choice of reaction" theory in the FIFRA context, (5) the distinc-
tion between pronouncement of rules and adjudicative judg-
ments, (6) the Court's analysis of the 1965 Cigarette Act in
Cipollone, and (7) the unavailability of other compensatory rem-
edies to victims of chemical torts, the most reasonable interpre-
tation of section 136v(b) is that it expressly preempts only posi-
tive enactments by state legislatures and executive agencies,
and does not expressly preempt state common law claims.
State Common Law Claims Do Not Impliedly Conflict with the
Regulatory Aims of FIFRA
In keeping with the alternative preemption analysis suggested
above, an implied "field" analysis is not necessary in the FIFRA
context because Congress specifically enacted a preemption pro-
vision in that statute.315 Thus, the final step in ascertaining
the preemptive scope of section 136v(b) is an implied "conflict"
analysis in order to determine if state common law claims would
313. See supra notes 291-97 and accompanying text.
314. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).
315. See supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
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make FIFRA compliance impossible, frustrate federal legislative
objectives, or impair a federally-created right. 16
As noted above, a jury award of damages to a chemical prod-
uct consumer would not require the manufacturer to change that
product's label.317 The EPA Administrator, not state court judg-
es, has the authority to reqire a change in the labeling of a
particular chemical product." '8 Moreover, the Administrator
approves or disapproves a proposed label based upon informa-
tion submitted by the manufacturer, including laboratory results
and empirical evidence such as product liability claims. 19
Thus, rather than rendering compliance with FIFRA impossible,
state common law claims for inadequate warnings would effec-
tively encourage manufacturer compliance with FIFRA.
Similarly, state common law claims serve to further FIFRA's
objective of protecting public health, wildlife, and the environ-
ment from unreasonable adverse effects of chemical product
development.320 Under the current regulatory scheme, a manu-
facturer is subject to possible civil and criminal liability for
failing to provide all relevant information to the EPA when
originally petitioning for product registration and approval.321
These penalties provide a sufficient incentive to manufacturers
to disclose all pertinent data when initially soliciting the EPA
for approval. They do not, however, provide any incentive to
manufacturers to undertake additional studies of empirical evi-
dence once a chemical product has been approved. State common
law product liability claims are the most effective check to possi-
ble manufacturer negligence or willful ignorance in ensuring the
safety of chemical products that have been brought into the
stream of commerce. Indeed, EPA regulations implementing
FIFRA expressly contemplate the use of state tort claims in
assessing the hazards of chemical products that have received
316. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 300-05 and accompanying text.
318. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
319. See id. §§ 136a(c)(2), 136d(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also 40 C.F.R. §§
152.50(f)(iv), 153.74 (1993).
320. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
321. 7 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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approval. 2 Thus, rather than obstructing the realization of
FIFRA's objectives, state common law claims effectuate those
objectives by giving manufacturers an affirmative incentive to
engage in ongoing evaluations of their products and encouraging
them to cease the manufacture and sale of those chemical prod-
ucts that pose an unreasonable risk to public health, wildlife
and the environment.3
Although state common law actions might not further the
objective of uniformity to the extent that they would further the
environmental objectives of FIFRA, uniformity is not an obtain-
able objective under the regulatory structure currently outlined
in FIFRA, regardless of whether state common law claims are
preempted. Presently, .manufacturers play an extremely active
role in the regulation of their own pesticides. Indeed, they pro-
pose their own labels when submitting a product for EPA ap-
proval and registration.Y2 4 At least two federal courts in sepa-
rate jurisdictions 25 have noted that the purported federal in-
terest in uniformity does not justify preempting traditional state
police power: "Under FIFRA, no such uniform labeling oc-
curs. ('the requirements nevertheless permit labeling varia-
tions even among products containing the same active ingredi-
ent. Thus, to argue that a [sic] adverse jury award would threat-
en FIFRA's policy of uniform labeling belies the truth.')"32 6 Be-
cause allowing state common law claims would not further un-
dermine the purported government interest in uniform labeling
requirements, the federal government should defer to the tradi-
tional police powers of the states.
Lastly, FIFRA does not implicate any federally-created statu-
tory right so as to render state common law tort actions pre-
empted by virtue of interference with such rights. In fact, state
common law products liability claims serve to safeguard the
322. 40 C.F.R. § 153.74 (1993).
323. See supra notes 300-05 and accompanying text.
324. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
325. See MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 813 F Supp. 1258, (E.D. Tex. 1993), rev'd,
27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir.
1987).
326. MacDonald, 813 F Supp. at 1261 (quoting Riden v. ICI Ams., Inc., 763 F
Supp. 1500 (W.D. Mo. 1991)); see also supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.
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rights of consumers to legal recourse for torts against their per-
son or property
Rather than conflicting with federal regulatory structure,
objectives, or rights, state common law damages actions would
encourage stricter compliance with FIFRA requirements, pro-
mote the objectives of FIFRA, and preserve the rights of citizens.
CONCLUSION
The Court's reformulation of preemption analysis in Cipollone
does not strike the proper balance between the Supremacy
Clause and basic notions of federalism. As noted above,327
Cipollone's two key holdings are: (1) that implied preemption
analysis is altogether unnecessary where Congress has enacted
an express preemption provision and (2) that such express pre-
emption provisions should be narrowly construed absent some
clear and manifest evidence of congressional intent to preempt
the historic police powers of the states. The first of these hold-
ings is not in accord with the Supremacy Clause because it re-
quires a Congress which endeavors to enact a preemption provi-
sion to expressly preempt all potentially conflicting state laws,
thereby depriving Congress of its inherent constitutional power
to supersede substantively conflicting state law which may not
be expressly enumerated in the preemption provision. 2
The second of Cippolone's key holdings is deeply rooted in no-
tions of our federal system of government.3" When coupled
with the lack of a requirement to engage in implied "conflict"
preemption analysis, however, the federalism concerns embodied
in Cipollone's affirmation of the presumption against preemption
effectively provide to Congress a disincentive to enact any pre-
emption provisions at all.3 The Court should reformulate its
preemption analysis in Cipollone to require an implied "conflict"
preemption analysis even where Congress has enacted an ex-
press preemption provision. Not only would such a reformulation
327. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 253-59 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., supra note 271 and accompqnying text.
330. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
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reconcile the Court's approach to preemption questions with the
Supremacy Clause,3 ' but it would also accord the historic po-
lice powers of the states their proper import in our federal sys-
tem of government.3 ' In addition, such a reformulation would
provide to Congress an incentive to enact preemption provisions
where it intends to displace state authority, since such provi-
sions would provide the best evidence of the clear and manifest
congressional intent to override the default powers of the states
which is necessary to rebut the presumption against preemp-
tion. 33
3
The series of FIFRA preemption cases decided in both federal
and state courts in the wake of Cipollone is perhaps the most
publicized example of the widespread confusion and debate re-
garding the preemption analysis formulated by the Court in that
case. 4 Consequently, the FIFRA preemption controversy rep-
resents an ideal opportunity for the Court to reconsider the
Cipollone approach to preemption issues and pronounce a new
requirement of implied "conflict" analysis in all preemption cas-
es. Moreover, if the Court were to utilize a FIFRA preemption
case to adopt such an approach, it would have the opportunity to
pervade its new preemption model with some flexibility based
upon the regulatory structure and objectives of the federal stat-
ute at issue. Specifically, a Supreme Court pronouncement of the
requirement of implied "conflict" preemption in the context of a
FIFRA case would enable the Court to admit that where an
express preemption provision is ambiguous about the viability of
state common law claims, as FIFRA's preemption provision is,
the preclusive effect of that provision turns on whether state
common law claims impliedly conflict with the regulatory struc-
ture and objectives of the federal statute. The resolution of this
331. See supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 194-246 and accompanying text.
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pivotal question in a FIFRA preemption case should be abun-
dantly clear: not only do state common law claims not conflict
with the regulatory structure and objectives of FIFRA, they are
explicitly contemplated in the regulatory structure of the statute
and would serve to effectuate its articulated objectives.335
Stephen D. Otero
335. See supra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
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